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		<title>Microsoft Ignite 2026: Copilot becomes the work operating system with Autopilot</title>
		<link>https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-20-am-en/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=rafael-fuentes-2026-11-20-am-en</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rafael Fuentes]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 05:12:08 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial Intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Compliance and Regulations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Email]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-20-am-en/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On November 17, Microsoft launched Autopilot, Work IQ, and Agent 365 at Ignite, moving Copilot from assistant to execution and governance layer in your tenant.</p>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-20-am-en/">Microsoft Ignite 2026: Copilot becomes the work operating system with Autopilot</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<section lang="en">
<p><a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-20-am-es/" hreflang="es">Leer este artículo en español</a></p>
<p>On November 17, Microsoft wrapped up Ignite 2026 by shifting Copilot&#8217;s axis: it is no longer just a chat assistant, but the execution and governance layer that unifies models, agents, data, and applications inside your tenant. For you, who manage identity, security, or architecture in Microsoft 365 environments, the change is immediate: Autopilot begins rolling out in the Frontier program with its own identity (Entra Agent ID) and native containment via MXC, Intune, and Defender; Work IQ already reasons across 19.5 exabytes of email, Teams, and files; and Agent 365 adds «completed work» analytics and hard spending limits in Cowork. All of this lands today, not on the roadmap, according to the <a href='https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/copilot/blog/2026/11/17/copilot-at-microsoft-ignite-expanding-whats-possible-with-intelligence-built-for-work'>official Microsoft Copilot Blog announcement</a>.</p>
<h2>Autopilot launches in Frontier with its own identity and containment via MXC</h2>
<p>Autopilot isn&#8217;t just another bot: it lives in your tenant, has persistent memory, its own tools, and a designated human manager. Its deployment starts today for Frontier customers and forces you to review conditional access policies and audit agent actions. Local agent containment relies on Microsoft Execution Containers (MXC) integrated with Intune and Defender, but requires Windows 365 for Agents and Intune/Defender P2 licenses; some MCP/tool controls remain in preview. If you&#8217;re not in Frontier, plan the pilot with explicit access scope and don&#8217;t use it to replace human approvals for critical actions.</p>
<h2>Work IQ reasons across 19.5 exabytes and Workspaces enables multi-agent</h2>
<p>Work IQ is now available and knows what to search across 90 billion emails, 15 billion Teams messages, and 10 billion new files each week. Workspaces, also in Frontier, turns collaboration into true multiplayer: people and agents share context toward a common goal. For architects, this means the organization&#8217;s knowledge graph stops being passive and becomes an automatic decision surface; review sensitivity labels and DLP before exposing sensitive data to these flows.</p>
<h2>Copilot Managed Runtime is now GA and Copilot Code arrives in weeks</h2>
<p>Secure hosting for apps built in natural language (Copilot Managed Runtime) is GA as of today; Copilot Code, which lets non-developers build solutions, will be GA «in the coming weeks.» The apps inherit M365 permissions, sensitivity labels, and DLP, and are governed from the M365 Admin Center. Use it first for low-risk internal apps; validate that the runtime meets your data residency and isolation requirements before moving regulated workloads.</p>
<h2>On-demand secret scanning in Copilot CLI, app, and code review</h2>
<p>GitHub has enabled on-demand secret scanning inside Copilot&#8217;s security review in public preview: it detects over 500 credential types using provider patterns and a fine-tuned model that reads context (passwords in connection strings, etc.). You enable it manually per tool (CLI, app, SDK, code review) and it only analyzes the changes under review, not the repo history. Enable it now in your review pipelines; it reduces credential leakage in AI-generated code at no extra plan cost, according to the <a href='https://github.blog/changelog/2026-11-17-secret-scanning-on-demand-for-developers-and-agents'>GitHub changelog</a>.</p>
<h2>Cost and model governance: Business Analytics and Auto routing</h2>
<p>Agent 365 Business Analytics (Frontier Public) measures investment in «completed work hours,» not tokens, and Cost Management enforces hard per-team limits in Cowork (consumption in AI credits, Secret Protection SKU). Auto routing selects among GPT-6.2, Claude, and Microsoft models optimizing for quality, speed, and cost, but does not guarantee model-specific regulatory compliance; define model governance policies in the tenant and validate what data goes to each provider. The Salesforce integration (public preview, 38 skills) and Dynamics 365 (100+ skills) are managed in a unified catalog with central registration; configure CRM/ERP permissions before enabling.</p>
<section class="article-reference">
<h2>Structured reference for readers and AI agents</h2>
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  &quot;author&quot;: &quot;Rafael Fuentes&quot;,
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</section>
</section>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-20-am-en/">Microsoft Ignite 2026: Copilot becomes the work operating system with Autopilot</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>NGINX2Root: 5 Critical RCEs in HTTP/2, HTTP/3, Resolver, and Mail Proxy — Patches Available</title>
		<link>https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-19-pm-en/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=rafael-fuentes-2026-11-19-pm-en</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rafael Fuentes]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 19:12:01 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cybersecurity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cybersecurity News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Threat hunting]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-19-pm-en/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>F5 releases patches for five RCEs in NGINX; CVE-2026-123007 affects HTTP/2 since 2015 and enables root escape chained with unpatched kernel SCTP bug.</p>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-19-pm-en/">NGINX2Root: 5 Critical RCEs in HTTP/2, HTTP/3, Resolver, and Mail Proxy — Patches Available</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<section lang="en">
<p><a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-19-pm-es/" hreflang="es">Leer este artículo en español</a></p>
<p>On November 18, F5 released patches for five remote code execution vulnerabilities in NGINX grouped under the name NGINX2Root. The most critical, CVE-2026-123007, affects the HTTP/2 module since version 1.9.5 from 2015 and only requires HTTP/2 over TLS enabled — the default configuration in virtually any modern HTTPS deployment. A working public exploit already achieves RCE as the NGINX worker user, and researchers have demonstrated chaining it with an unpatched flaw in the Linux kernel&#8217;s SCTP subsystem to escape the container and gain root on the host. If you administer web servers, Kubernetes ingress controllers, or base images with NGINX, this news forces you to act today.</p>
<h2>CVE-2026-123007 enables RCE with just HTTP/2 over TLS, the default configuration in virtually all modern HTTPS</h2>
<p>The flaw is a buffer overflow in HTTP/2 flow control window handling (ngx_http_v2_module). All it takes is for the server to accept encrypted HTTP/2 connections — which the vast majority of HTTPS sites do by default — for an unauthenticated attacker to corrupt worker memory. The exploit published by Rapid7 on GitHub (sfewer-r7/CVE-2026-123007) works against NGINX 1.31.8 in a container with HTTP/2/TLS, requires roughly 128 GB of HTTP/2 traffic, and bypasses ASLR by leaking heap addresses from server responses. The code is specific to glibc on x86-64, but it proves the vulnerability is exploitable under real-world conditions. <a href='https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000163926'>The F5 advisory K000163926</a> confirms CVSS 4.0 9.2 and CVSS 3.1 8.1.</p>
<h2>Chaining the NGINX bug with a kernel SCTP use-after-free escapes to root on the host</h2>
<p>Researchers from Theori (Xint) have shown that after compromising the NGINX worker, a use-after-free in the Linux kernel&#8217;s SCTP implementation (present since version 4.15) can be leveraged to escalate privileges to root on the host. The kernel flaw has no assigned CVE and no public patch as of November 18; Xint is withholding technical details. This breaks the container boundary: if the container can open SCTP sockets (whether because it has CAP_SYS_MODULE or because the module is already loaded on the host), the jump to root is real. <a href='https://www.upwind.io/blog/nginx-cve-2026-123007-and-cve-2026-123633-four-web-facing-rces-one-patch-and-where-kubernetes-is-exposed'>Upwind&#8217;s analysis</a> details the full chain and notes that NGINX doesn&#8217;t use SCTP legitimately, so any SCTP socket opened from a worker process is an indicator of compromise.</p>
<h2>Ubuntu, Debian, RHEL, and OpenResty have no backported fix as of November 18, and ingress-nginx community is archived</h2>
<p>Here&#8217;s the operational problem: many organizations believe they&#8217;re patched because nginx -v shows a recent version, but distributions apply fixes without changing the version string. As of November 18, Ubuntu 22.04/24.04/26.04, Debian 12, RHEL 8/9, and OpenResty 1.31.8.1 have no fixed packages. Alpine 3.24 and edge do include 1.30.7-r0. Additionally, the ingress-nginx community controller has been archived since March 2026 (v1.15.1) and will not receive updates. The official Docker images were updated the same day with tags 1.30.7, 1.31.9, mainline, stable, and latest, but you must pull again and rebuild. <a href='https://www.tenable.com/blog/nginx2root-cve-2026-123007-frequently-asked-questions-about-five-critical-nginx'>Tenable&#8217;s FAQ</a> and <a href='https://cycode.com/blog/nginx2root-cve-2026-123007'>Cycode&#8217;s article</a> explain how to verify the actual package with dpkg -l, rpm -q, or apk info.</p>
<h2>Reloading the configuration isn&#8217;t enough: you must restart the binary or perform a hot binary upgrade</h2>
<p>An nginx -s reload doesn&#8217;t replace the in-memory binary; old workers keep serving existing connections with the vulnerable code. The only safe way is to restart the service (systemctl restart nginx or equivalent) or perform a hot binary upgrade. As a temporary measure, if you can&#8217;t patch today, disable HTTP/2 in exposed server blocks (http2 off and remove http2 from the listen directive) and reload — though old workers will remain vulnerable until they die. Verify with openssl s_client -connect host:443 -alpn h2 that h2 is no longer negotiated. This doesn&#8217;t protect against the HTTP/3 (CVE-2026-121810) or resolver (CVE-2026-123634) flaws. Also block the SCTP kernel module (echo «install sctp /bin/false» &gt; /etc/modprobe.d/disable-sctp.conf) and reboot the host or unload the module if it&#8217;s not in use. Start threat hunting from November 18 onward, looking for workers spawning binaries, repeated crashes, anomalous connection patterns, and SCTP sockets.</p>
<section class="article-reference">
<h2>Structured reference for readers and AI agents</h2>
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  &quot;title&quot;: &quot;NGINX2Root: 5 Critical RCEs in HTTP/2, HTTP/3, Resolver, and Mail Proxy — Patches Available&quot;,
  &quot;summary&quot;: &quot;F5 releases patches for five RCEs in NGINX; CVE-2026-123007 affects HTTP/2 since 2015 and enables root escape chained with unpatched kernel SCTP bug.&quot;,
  &quot;author&quot;: &quot;Rafael Fuentes&quot;,
  &quot;publicationDate&quot;: &quot;2026-11-19T20:01:16.058+01:00&quot;,
  &quot;eventDate&quot;: &quot;2026-11-18&quot;,
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  &quot;topics&quot;: [
    &quot;Cybersecurity&quot;,
    &quot;Cybersecurity News&quot;,
    &quot;English&quot;
  ],
  &quot;sources&quot;: [
    &quot;https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000163926&quot;,
    &quot;https://www.upwind.io/blog/nginx-cve-2026-123007-and-cve-2026-123633-four-web-facing-rces-one-patch-and-where-kubernetes-is-exposed&quot;,
    &quot;https://www.tenable.com/blog/nginx2root-cve-2026-123007-frequently-asked-questions-about-five-critical-nginx&quot;,
    &quot;https://cycode.com/blog/nginx2root-cve-2026-123007&quot;
  ]
}</code></pre>
</section>
</section>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-19-pm-en/">NGINX2Root: 5 Critical RCEs in HTTP/2, HTTP/3, Resolver, and Mail Proxy — Patches Available</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<item>
		<title>CISA adds critical RCE in Puppet Enterprise (CVE-2026-115731) to KEV</title>
		<link>https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-19-am-en/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=rafael-fuentes-2026-11-19-am-en</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rafael Fuentes]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 05:11:43 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cybersecurity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cybersecurity News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-19-am-en/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>CISA adds CVE-2026-115731 to its exploited vulnerabilities catalog; affects Puppet Enterprise and Core, allows RCE as puppet user, and requires patching before December 1 for federal agencies.</p>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-19-am-en/">CISA adds critical RCE in Puppet Enterprise (CVE-2026-115731) to KEV</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<section lang="en">
<p><a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-19-am-es/" hreflang="es">Leer este artículo en español</a></p>
<p>CISA added CVE-2026-115731 to its KEV catalog on November 17, a critical deserialization flaw in Puppet Enterprise and Puppet Core that is already being actively exploited and allows remote code execution as the Puppet Server service user; the deadline for U.S. federal agencies expires on December 1 and serves as a reference for <em>due diligence</em> for audits under ENS or ISO 27001 in Spain and Latam.</p>
<h2>Unsafe deserialization in report processing allows RCE as the puppet user</h2>
<p>The vector lies in the component that processes the JSON reports sent by agents. The server uses <code>FromDataConverter</code> to reconstruct types from a field <code>__ptype</code> controlled by the attacker; a malicious type definition reaches a code path that evaluates arbitrary Ruby code and executes with the privileges of the Puppet Server service user. The CVSS 4.0 score is 9.4 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H), confirming critical severity, low complexity, and scope change.</p>
<h2>Certificate auto-signing turns the flaw into RCE without prior authentication</h2>
<p>To exploit the vulnerability you need an agent certificate signed by the Puppet CA. If the CA is configured with auto-signing without strong verification (<code>autosign.conf</code> permissive), any actor with network access to port 8140 can obtain a valid certificate and chain the exploitation without prior credentials. The advisory from <a href='https://ccb.belgium.be/advisories/warning-deserialization-untrusted-data-puppet-server-can-be-exploited-execute-arbitrary'>CCB Belgium</a> rates it as &#8216;actively exploited in the wild, public PoC, patch immediately.&#8217;</p>
<h2>Patches available since November 3; the same update covers the authorization bypass</h2>
<p>Perforce released the fixes on November 3. The fixed versions are:</p>
<ul>
<li>Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.0 → <strong>2026.0.1</strong></li>
<li>Puppet Enterprise 2025.0.0 → <strong>2025.12.1</strong></li>
<li>Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.0 → <strong>2023.8.13</strong></li>
<li>Puppet Core 9.0.0 → <strong>9.1.3</strong></li>
<li>Puppet Core 8.x → <strong>8.22.2</strong></li>
</ul>
<p>These same releases also fix <strong>CVE-2026-115732</strong> (authorization bypass via certificate name, CVSS 9.0). Verify in the <em>release notes</em> from the vendor that both CVEs are listed as resolved.</p>
<h2>Federal December 1 deadline and reference for <em>due diligence</em> in ENS and ISO 27001</h2>
<p>The BOD 26-04 directive requires U.S. federal civilian agencies to remediate before <strong>December 1, 2026</strong> (14 days after inclusion in KEV). Although not binding outside that scope, CISA urges <em>all organizations</em> to prioritize remediation, and frameworks such as NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (control SI-2) or PCI DSS 4.0 (req. 6.3.3) use it as a reference for <em>timely patching</em>. In Spain and Latam it serves as an objective argument in ENS, ISO 27001 audits, or contracts with vulnerability management clauses.</p>
<h2>What to do today: update, audit certificates, and look for prior compromise</h2>
<ol>
<li><strong>Update now</strong> to the patched versions and <strong>restart Puppet Server</strong>. Test in staging before production.</li>
<li><strong>Disable weak auto-signing</strong>: remove or harden <code>autosign.conf</code> requiring PSK, OIDC, or manual approval. This does not replace the patch, because a legitimately signed certificate can still exploit the bug.</li>
<li><strong>Restrict network access</strong> to trusted management networks; never expose port 8140 to the internet.</li>
<li><strong>Audit and revoke certificates</strong>: list with <code>puppetserver ca list --all</code> and revoke unrecognized ones with <code>puppetserver ca revoke --certname &lt;nombre&gt;</code>. You need a reliable inventory of managed nodes.</li>
<li><strong>Look for prior compromise (forensic)</strong>: review logs of the endpoint <code>/puppet/v3/report</code> (anomalous PUTs), child processes of the user <code>puppet</code>, CA keys in <code>/etc/puppetlabs/puppet/ssl/ca/</code> and new service accounts. If you detect compromise, rotate <strong>all</strong> CA keys and credentials distributed by Puppet.</li>
<li><strong>If you use Puppet Open Source (community)</strong>: there is no official patch; plan migration to <strong>OpenVox</strong> or <strong>Puppet Core</strong> supported, evaluating module compatibility and <em>workflows</em>.</li>
</ol>
<blockquote><p>Note on the contradiction in sources: <em>SecurityAffairs</em> cites Perforce as saying that “there are no reports of active exploitation,” while the alert from <a href='https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/11/17/cisa-adds-one-known-exploited-vulnerability-catalog'>CISA</a>, the Belgian CCB, Neodyme AG, and Reddit witnesses confirm exploitation in the wild since November 4. Technical evidence and KEV inclusion prevail.</p></blockquote>
<section class="article-reference">
<h2>Structured reference for readers and AI agents</h2>
<pre><code class="language-json">{
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  &quot;summary&quot;: &quot;CISA adds CVE-2026-115731 to its exploited vulnerabilities catalog; affects Puppet Enterprise and Core, allows RCE as puppet user, and requires patching before December 1 for federal agencies.&quot;,
  &quot;author&quot;: &quot;Rafael Fuentes&quot;,
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  &quot;eventDate&quot;: &quot;2026-11-17&quot;,
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    &quot;https://ccb.belgium.be/advisories/warning-deserialization-untrusted-data-puppet-server-can-be-exploited-execute-arbitrary&quot;
  ]
}</code></pre>
</section>
</section>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-19-am-en/">CISA adds critical RCE in Puppet Enterprise (CVE-2026-115731) to KEV</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
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		<title>AWS makes Bedrock AgentCore runtime V2 default and publishes self-healing ETL guide</title>
		<link>https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-18-am-en/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=rafael-fuentes-2026-11-18-am-en</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rafael Fuentes]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 05:12:50 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial Intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Big data]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Healthcare]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-18-am-en/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Starting November 12, new AgentCore runtimes use V2 in 22 regions with <2 s startup and scale-to-zero; AWS publishes a self-healing ETL pattern with four agents and dual correction.
</p>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-18-am-en/">AWS makes Bedrock AgentCore runtime V2 default and publishes self-healing ETL guide</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<section lang="en">
<p><a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-18-am-es/" hreflang="es">Leer este artículo en español</a></p>
<p>AWS has changed the default runtime of Amazon Bedrock AgentCore to version V2 in 22 regions —including Europe (Spain, Frankfurt, Ireland, London, Milan, Paris), the U.S., Canada, South America (São Paulo), and Asia Pacific— starting November 12, 2026. Existing runtimes remain on V1 unless you explicitly update them with <code>platformVersion=V2</code>; if you need to force V1 in a region where V2 is the default, use <code>platformVersion=V1</code> when creating or updating the runtime.</p>
<h2>Runtime V2 default in 22 regions since November 12</h2>
<p>The official announcement confirms that <a href='https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2026/11/new-agentcore-runtime-default'>the new generation of AgentCore runtime is now the default</a> in the listed regions. Each session is restored from a snapshot of the initialized agent, eliminating the traditional cold start and allowing compute and memory to scale with the workload. Inactive agents scale to zero, and memory is reclaimed within minutes.</p>
<h2>Startup in &lt;2 s, scale-to-zero, and up to 68% less billed memory</h2>
<p>With 2 GB images, the P75 cold start drops to under 2 seconds compared to 29.7 s in V1. Scaling reaches up to 8 vCPU, 32 GB of memory, and images up to 10 GB. AWS quantifies up to 68% less billed memory for multi-turn agents with natural pauses; for continuous streaming agents the savings will be lower. Monitor actual cost with Cost Explorer filtering by <code>AgentCoreRuntime</code>.</p>
<h2>Controlled migration: you decide when to move each runtime</h2>
<p>Existing runtimes do not migrate automatically. To move one, update it with <code>platformVersion=V2</code>. In regions where V2 is not yet the default (Middle East, Israel, China), you must also specify <code>platformVersion=V2</code> when creating it. Validate in staging with your real images before touching production: measure cold start, memory reclamation, and billing.</p>
<h2>Self-healing ETL pattern: detect→correct→persist→remediate loop</h2>
<p>The next day, the AWS Big Data blog published <a href='https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/big-data/build-a-self-healing-etl-pipeline-with-amazon-bedrock-agentcore'>a complete guide that implements a closed-loop data quality</a>. The architecture uses AWS Glue as a quality gate and Bedrock AgentCore (Strands Agents SDK) to orchestrate four agents: <em>orchestrator</em>, <em>correction</em>, <em>persistence</em> and <em>remediation</em>. Correction combines semantic search in Knowledge Bases with deterministic lookup in S3 Vectors.</p>
<h2>Four agents, dual correction, and configurable confidence threshold</h2>
<p>The <em>orchestrator</em> only applies the correction if the strategy exceeds the 0.7 confidence threshold; otherwise it notifies via SNS for manual review. You can adjust the threshold by domain: 0.85+ for financial or healthcare data, 0.6 for non-sensitive telemetry, always with the SNS fallback active. The optional remediation opens pull requests in GitHub via MCP Server with the root cause, but does not auto-merge.</p>
<h2>End-to-end CDK deployment and integrated governance</h2>
<p>The example repository deploys six CDK Python stacks (DataLake, Ingestion, Glue, KnowledgeBase, AgentCore, AgentCoreRuntime) and includes test scripts with synthetic NOAA data. The zone <code>corrected/</code> of the data lake is audited with metadata from the applied strategy. You can enable Bedrock Guardrails as an extra governance layer.</p>
<h2>Immediate steps for your environment</h2>
<ul>
<li>Validate V2 in staging with your real images: measure cold-start, memory reclamation, and real cost with Cost Explorer filtering by <code>AgentCoreRuntime</code>.</li>
<li>If you are in an unlisted region (Middle East, Israel, China), deploy with <code>platformVersion=V2</code> explicitly and verify availability before architecting multi-region.</li>
<li>For automatic remediation, use Secrets Manager and GitHub MCP Server with a token of scope <code>repo</code> and rotated credentials; the agent only opens PRs, does not merge.</li>
<li>Adjust the confidence threshold based on the criticality of your data and always keep the human fallback via SNS active.</li>
</ul>
<section class="article-reference">
<h2>Structured reference for readers and AI agents</h2>
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  &quot;summary&quot;: &quot;Starting November 12, new AgentCore runtimes use V2 in 22 regions with &lt;2 s startup and scale-to-zero; AWS publishes a self-healing ETL pattern with four agents and dual correction.&quot;,
  &quot;author&quot;: &quot;Rafael Fuentes&quot;,
  &quot;publicationDate&quot;: &quot;2026-11-18T06:01:16.052+01:00&quot;,
  &quot;eventDate&quot;: &quot;2026-11-12&quot;,
  &quot;url&quot;: &quot;https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-18-am-en/&quot;,
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    &quot;https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2026/11/new-agentcore-runtime-default&quot;,
    &quot;https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/big-data/build-a-self-healing-etl-pipeline-with-amazon-bedrock-agentcore&quot;
  ]
}</code></pre>
</section>
</section>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-18-am-en/">AWS makes Bedrock AgentCore runtime V2 default and publishes self-healing ETL guide</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
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		<title>CISA adds Check Point Gaia LPE (CVE-2026-123039) to KEV, chained with PHP2Shell</title>
		<link>https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-16-pm-en/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=rafael-fuentes-2026-11-16-pm-en</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rafael Fuentes]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 19:13:22 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cybersecurity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cybersecurity News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Malware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Firewall]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-16-pm-en/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>CISA added CVE-2026-123039 to its KEV catalog on November 13; it is exploited in chain with PHP2Shell to gain root on Check Point gateways and, in some cases, destroy ESXi hypervisors.</p>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-16-pm-en/">CISA adds Check Point Gaia LPE (CVE-2026-123039) to KEV, chained with PHP2Shell</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<section lang="en">
<p><a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-16-pm-es/" hreflang="es">Leer este artículo en español</a></p>
<p>CISA added CVE-2026-123039 to its KEV catalog on November 13, a local privilege escalation in the Check Point Gaia DynamicCLI service that is being chained with PHP2Shell to gain root control of perimeter gateways and, in documented cases, destroy ESXi hypervisors.</p>
<h2>The vulnerability and why it is critical</h2>
<p>The process <code>dynamic_server</code>, which runs as root, listens on the local socket <code>/tmp/dynamic_socket</code> created with 0777 permissions and without client authentication. Any authenticated local user can send arbitrary commands that execute as root. Check Point rates it CVSS 3.1 7.8 High (<code>AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</code>).</p>
<h2>Observed exploitation chain</h2>
<p>Check Point Research observed activity between October 30 and November 4: first PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, CVSS 9.2) on the internet-exposed Mobile Access portal, then the LPE to escalate to root, and finally persistence with PHP webshells and the TSGA/TSProxy backdoor. In a limited number of cases they deployed the wiper <code>destroy_v6</code> against VMware ESXi hosts. Only a few dozen unpatched systems in a single region were compromised according to the <a href='https://blog.checkpoint.com/security/security-advisory-active-exploitation-of-php2shell-and-local-privilege-escalation'>Check Point advisory</a>.</p>
<h2>Affected versions and mandatory patch</h2>
<p>Affects Security Gateways, Management/Log Servers, Multi-Domain Security Management, and Maestro Orchestrator on Gaia R82.20, R82.10, R82, R81.20, R81.10, and R81. Spark Firewalls and Smart-1 Cloud are not affected. The fix arrives in the November Jumbo Hotfix with minimum Takes: R82.20 Take 14+, R82.10 Take 52+, R82 Take 132+, R81.20 Take 174+. R81.10 and R81 are end-of-support and receive no patch; the only safe path is to migrate to a supported version. The same Jumbo also fixes PHP2Shell (sk1000302) and CVE-2026-107484, as detailed in the <a href='https://www.rescana.com/post/checkpoint-gaia-cve-2026-123039-kev-patch-now'>Rescana analysis</a>.</p>
<h2>Temporary mitigation if you cannot patch yet</h2>
<p>Stop <code>dynamic_server</code> and prevent its restart with the exact commands:</p>
<pre><code>dbset process:dynamic_server
dbset :save</code></pre>
<p>This disables the Dynamic CLI documented in sk144112; Check Point advises following the SK1000362 steps exactly. It does not replace the patch.</p>
<h2>What to check in your logs and IOCs</h2>
<p>Look in <code>/var/log/dynamicCli.log</code> commands that don&#8217;t use the expected Clish wrapper; on patched systems you&#8217;ll see «Rejected connection from unauthorized uid» entries indicating blocked attempts. The IOCs published by Check Point include the IPs <code>130.94.19.204</code> and <code>130.94.19.168</code>, PHP session files containing the string <code>upload_progress_pwn</code>, processes disguised as <code>CPconfigdaemon</code>, scanning tools and wiper in <code>/tmp</code> or <code>/temp</code>, the note <em>Dream Annexation</em> with no ransom demand and unexplained gaps in traffic logs after the logging daemon crashed. Absence of matches does not rule out compromise.</p>
<h2>Actions for providers and MSPs</h2>
<p>If a third party operates your gateways, demand evidence of the installed Take, installation date, and confirmation that the PHP2Shell fix (sk1000302) is applied on gateways with exposed Mobile Access. Also verify that the Mobile Access portal is not accessible from the internet unless strictly necessary. The <a href='https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/11/13/cisa-adds-two-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog'>CISA alert</a> sets a November 16 deadline for U.S. federal agencies, raising operational priority to a 72-hour SLA even if you&#8217;re not subject to BOD 26-04.</p>
<section class="article-reference">
<h2>Structured reference for readers and AI agents</h2>
<pre><code class="language-json">{
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  &quot;summary&quot;: &quot;CISA added CVE-2026-123039 to its KEV catalog on November 13; it is exploited in chain with PHP2Shell to gain root on Check Point gateways and, in some cases, destroy ESXi hypervisors.&quot;,
  &quot;author&quot;: &quot;Rafael Fuentes&quot;,
  &quot;publicationDate&quot;: &quot;2026-11-16T20:01:16.061+01:00&quot;,
  &quot;eventDate&quot;: &quot;2026-11-13&quot;,
  &quot;url&quot;: &quot;https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-16-pm-en/&quot;,
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    &quot;Cybersecurity&quot;,
    &quot;Cybersecurity News&quot;,
    &quot;English&quot;,
    &quot;Malware&quot;
  ],
  &quot;sources&quot;: [
    &quot;https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/11/13/cisa-adds-two-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog&quot;,
    &quot;https://blog.checkpoint.com/security/security-advisory-active-exploitation-of-php2shell-and-local-privilege-escalation&quot;,
    &quot;https://www.rescana.com/post/checkpoint-gaia-cve-2026-123039-kev-patch-now&quot;
  ]
}</code></pre>
</section>
</section>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-16-pm-en/">CISA adds Check Point Gaia LPE (CVE-2026-123039) to KEV, chained with PHP2Shell</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
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		<title>FBI alert: ARTEX framework automates intrusions with agentic AI at machine speed</title>
		<link>https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-15-am-en/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=rafael-fuentes-2026-11-15-am-en</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rafael Fuentes]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 05:13:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial Intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DeepSeek]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Supply Chain]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Healthcare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zero Trust]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-15-am-en/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The FBI warns in FLASH-20261113-001 that ARTEX, an autonomous LLM-based pentesting framework, is being used by criminals and nation-states to automate intrusions at machine speed since August.</p>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-15-am-en/">FBI alert: ARTEX framework automates intrusions with agentic AI at machine speed</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<section lang="en">
<p><a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-15-am-es/" hreflang="es">Leer este artículo en español</a></p>
<p>On November 13 the FBI made the advisory public <a href='https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261113.pdf'>FLASH-20261113-001</a> (TLP:CLEAR) warning that ARTEX, an autonomous LLM- and agent-based penetration testing framework, is being weaponized by «cybercriminals and nation-states» to automate multiple intrusion phases at machine speed, from reconnaissance to exfiltration. The alert confirms campaigns observed since August 2026 targeting financial services, government, technology, defense, semiconductors, energy, healthcare, manufacturing, telecommunications, and the legal sector.</p>
<h2>ARTEX translates natural-language objectives into commands executed by specialized agents</h2>
<p>The framework requires minimal human interaction and integrates with frontier models (Claude, GPT) and Chinese-origin models (DeepSeek, GLM, Grok, Kimi). According to the FBI, Chinese models—especially DeepSeek Flash—dominate offensive use due to their «capability, low cost, and lack of observable guardrails in a pentesting framework.» Censys identified more than 1,600 publicly exposed ARTEX console instances in early November; the actual total is higher when private networks are included.</p>
<h2>Confirmed cases: 67,000 financial records and 2,250 tenants compromised via ConnectWise</h2>
<p>The alert details two notable campaigns: attacks on South Korean financial institutions with exfiltration of personal data from approximately 67,000 individuals, and a supply-chain compromise of ConnectWise Cloud Backup that granted access to more than 2,250 downstream tenants. The TTPs mapped to MITRE ATT&amp;CK include cloud reconnaissance (T1580, T1087.004), initial access via unsigned SAML, XXE, SSRF, cross-account trust abuse (T1199), JSP/PHP webshells, Kerberoasting, DCSync, massive Active Directory enumeration (110,000+ objects), lateral movement with Pass-the-Ticket/Hash/WinRM, and exfiltration to webhook.site and new 100 GB volumes.</p>
<h2>The removal of the original repository does not stop proliferation</h2>
<p>The original developer («Autumn-27», identified as Li Puhua) removed the GitHub repository on October 8, but the framework continues to spread through forks, archived copies, and a commercial version called ARTEX PRO. This makes the threat persistent: the entry barrier collapses, allowing actors with minimal technical skill to execute sophisticated multi-target campaigns at a scale and speed that overwhelm traditional detection and response.</p>
<h2>Peripheral surfaces and supply chain: the primary vectors</h2>
<p>The framework excels at exploiting partner/supplier portals, mobile backends, employee apps, legacy systems, and third-party integrations—»systems that receive less security attention than flagship applications.» The agents map trust relationships and compromise weak suppliers to pivot to high-value enterprise networks. This forces organizations to prioritize shadow IT visibility and the inventory of internet-exposed assets.</p>
<h2>Actionable indicators of compromise and network behavior</h2>
<p>The FBI publishes concrete IOCs: ARTEX console IPs (38.244.50.120, ranges 144.172.64.0/24, 187.15.88.0/24), domains (xcai.pro), proxies, WISP C2 nodes (Storm-3358), ARTEX servers (91.92.240.238). At the network and behavioral level, notable are outbound API calls to api.anthropic.com, api.deepseek.com, open.bigmodel.cn, api.x.ai; high-frequency automated HTTP requests against login and search endpoints; structured data transfers over HTTPS to unauthorized destinations; and .aspx/.jsp webshells in unexpected paths. These patterns are already integrable into SIEM, EDR, and NDR.</p>
<h2>Immediate actions: inventory, Zero Trust, identity governance, and evidence preservation</h2>
<p>The FBI requires a comprehensive inventory of internet-exposed apps, including peripheral ones; restrict administration of cloud, network devices, publishing interfaces (Kudu/SCM), hypervisors, and backups to trusted networks or dedicated admin paths; disable basic publishing authentication where not needed; consider run-from-package models; govern public IP assignment before exposing workloads; and move enterprise apps behind Zero Trust Access where feasible. For identity: enforce least privilege in multi-tenant permissions, monitor credential additions and anomalous app-only activity, review all M365 tenants with affected ConnectWise apps by App ID, audit Entra ID, and require CA/Certificate Manager approval for high-risk enrollments. For applications: guardrails on high-impact APIs (rate limits, transaction thresholds), alert on sequential lookups and bulk access, do not return stack traces or framework details to unauthenticated users, and continuously scan for secrets in repos, container images, and pipelines. Preserve Entra sign-in/audit logs, Purview Audit, SIEM, and Graph telemetry; review activity since October 1 for ConnectWise; keep affected connections disabled until formal restoration instructions and do not delete enterprise apps as a first response. The coverage of <a href='https://therecord.media/artex-ai-tool-fbi-flash-alert'>The Record</a> confirms that the alert is TLP:CLEAR and can be shared without restriction with providers, partners, and national CERTs (INCIBE, CCN-CERT, regional CSIRTs).</p>
<section class="article-reference">
<h2>Structured reference for readers and AI agents</h2>
<pre><code class="language-json">{
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  &quot;language&quot;: &quot;en&quot;,
  &quot;title&quot;: &quot;FBI alert: ARTEX framework automates intrusions with agentic AI at machine speed&quot;,
  &quot;summary&quot;: &quot;The FBI warns in FLASH-20261113-001 that ARTEX, an autonomous LLM-based pentesting framework, is being used by criminals and nation-states to automate intrusions at machine speed since August.&quot;,
  &quot;author&quot;: &quot;Rafael Fuentes&quot;,
  &quot;publicationDate&quot;: &quot;2026-11-15T06:01:16.033+01:00&quot;,
  &quot;eventDate&quot;: &quot;2026-11-13&quot;,
  &quot;url&quot;: &quot;https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-15-am-en/&quot;,
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  },
  &quot;topics&quot;: [
    &quot;AI&quot;,
    &quot;Artificial Intelligence&quot;,
    &quot;DeepSeek&quot;,
    &quot;English&quot;,
    &quot;Supply Chain&quot;,
    &quot;Technology&quot;
  ],
  &quot;sources&quot;: [
    &quot;https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261113.pdf&quot;,
    &quot;https://therecord.media/artex-ai-tool-fbi-flash-alert&quot;
  ]
}</code></pre>
</section>
</section>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-15-am-en/">FBI alert: ARTEX framework automates intrusions with agentic AI at machine speed</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
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		<title>Google launches Gemini 4 Hydrogen: fast model for agents at $1.50/M tokens</title>
		<link>https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-13-pm-en/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=rafael-fuentes-2026-11-13-pm-en</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rafael Fuentes]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 19:11:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial Intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cybersecurity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cybersecurity News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-13-pm-en/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Google completes the Gemini 4 family with Hydrogen, a fast model for agents and daily code at $1.50/M tokens, unified 1M window and configurable thinking; warns of more refusals in multimodal.</p>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-13-pm-en/">Google launches Gemini 4 Hydrogen: fast model for agents at $1.50/M tokens</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<section lang="en">
<p><a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-13-pm-es/" hreflang="es">Leer este artículo en español</a></p>
<p>Google has released <a href='https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/models-and-research/gemini-models/introducing-gemini-4-hydrogen'>Gemini 4 Hydrogen</a> on November 12, just 48 hours after <a href='https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/models-and-research/gemini-models/gemini-4-carbon-now-available'>Gemini 4 Carbon</a>. Hydrogen is the «fast model for everyday execution», adapted from Carbon, and closes the Gemini 4 family: Argon (general balance, October), Carbon (deep reasoning and frontier cybersecurity), Hydrogen (agents and daily code). It affects you if you develop agent flows, migrate from 3.8 Flash, or evaluate inference costs at scale.</p>
<h2>Unified 1M-token window and long decode change the economics of long-running agents</h2>
<p>Hydrogen shares a 1,048,576-token window across input, thinking, and output. The default output is 65,536 tokens, but with <code>long decode</code> in background reaches 1M output tokens. Previously you had 1M input and 64K output separate; now the same budget covers large artifacts (code, reports, 3D visualizations) in a single conversation. Note: each turn charges the full input tokens.</p>
<h2>Configurable thinking with high default: adjust cost and latency</h2>
<p>Four levels: <code>low</code>, <code>medium</code>, <code>high</code> (default) and <code>xhigh</code> (new). In 3.8 Flash the default was <code>medium</code>. Raising to <code>xhigh</code> raises the AA Index from 51 to 54, but consumes more tokens and latency. For simple tasks, <code>low</code> or <code>medium</code> reduce cost. Configure it explicitly in the API call.</p>
<h2>Benchmarks: wins in its class but the regression in multimodal refusals forces monitoring</h2>
<p>Google reports Terminal-Bench 4.1 at 57% versus 18.2% for 3.8 Flash, reduces fabricated claims &gt;5× and is 2.5× faster in setting <code>high</code>. Leads its class in HLE-Diamond (58.8%), Vals Tax Agent Bench (52.3%, #1 global), Vals Legal Research Bench (55.8%, tie #1) and AutomationBench-AA. Agent safety: overreach -81%, under-service -79%, misaligned actions -12×, honesty 96.7%, CoT readability 99.9% without deceptive edits in &gt;200k turns, resistance to indirect injection &gt;2.3× (Gray Swan IPI).</p>
<p>The model card acknowledges a real regression: unjustified refusals rise 5.57 percentage points vs 3.8 Flash, «especially in multimodal prompts». Image-to-text improves 7 pp in safety. If your app uses images, PDFs, or audio intensively, check production logs for false positives.</p>
<h2>Orchestrator in Antigravity combines Carbon and Hydrogen to save quota and time</h2>
<p>The Orchestrator dynamically alternates Carbon (coordinator/auditor) and Hydrogen (workers/verifiers). In Terminal-Bench 4.0 it achieves success rates close to Carbon while consuming 24% less quota and 19% less time. The native multi-model strategy (/swarm) allows maintaining quality on mixed tasks without paying for Carbon for everything.</p>
<h2>What to do now: migration, Fairwind, and scientific program</h2>
<ol>
<li><strong>Evaluate 3.8 Flash → Hydrogen migration</strong> with your real workloads (latency, cost/1k accepted tasks). Partners report 2–2.8× speedup and -12% to -23% tokens, but Google does not detail test conditions.</li>
<li><strong>Use Orchestrator/swarm in Antigravity</strong> for mixed workloads: Carbon for architecture and deep debugging, Hydrogen for writing, tests, and verification.</li>
<li><strong>Configure thinking level explicitly</strong>; do not assume the default <code>high</code> if your tasks are simple.</li>
<li><strong>Monitor unjustified refusals in multimodal</strong>; the 5.57 pp increase is significant in production.</li>
<li><strong>Leverage the unified 1M window + long decode</strong> for agents that generate large artifacts, accounting that each turn reloads the input.</li>
<li><strong>Enroll in the Fairwind Program</strong> if you audit open source code or critical infrastructure; Carbon demonstrates 100% recall and 95% precision in scanning and triage, with &gt;25% relative improvement vs Argon in detection of real logic flaws.</li>
<li><strong>Researchers: apply to the scientific program</strong> (10k spots, 6 months free Argon+Carbon in Antigravity) for formal verification, structural prediction, enzymatic assays, etc.</li>
</ol>
<p>Hydrogen&#8217;s flat pricing ($1.50/M input, $7.50/M output) doubles current 3.8 Flash, but 3.8 Flash will rise to that level on January 1, 2027. Knowledge cutoff: March 2026.</p>
<section class="article-reference">
<h2>Structured reference for readers and AI agents</h2>
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  &quot;summary&quot;: &quot;Google completes the Gemini 4 family with Hydrogen, a fast model for agents and daily code at $1.50/M tokens, unified 1M window and configurable thinking; warns of more refusals in multimodal.&quot;,
  &quot;author&quot;: &quot;Rafael Fuentes&quot;,
  &quot;publicationDate&quot;: &quot;2026-11-13T20:01:16.036+01:00&quot;,
  &quot;eventDate&quot;: &quot;2026-11-12&quot;,
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    &quot;https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/models-and-research/gemini-models/introducing-gemini-4-hydrogen&quot;
  ]
}</code></pre>
</section>
</section>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-13-pm-en/">Google launches Gemini 4 Hydrogen: fast model for agents at $1.50/M tokens</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Apache HTTP Server 2.4.71 Fixes Critical RCE in mod_http2 (CVE-2026-119618)</title>
		<link>https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-12-pm-en/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=rafael-fuentes-2026-11-12-pm-en</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rafael Fuentes]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 19:20:30 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cybersecurity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cybersecurity News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-12-pm-en/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Apache releases version 2.4.71 fixing a race condition in mod_http2 that allows unauthenticated remote code execution on servers with HTTP/2 enabled.</p>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-12-pm-en/">Apache HTTP Server 2.4.71 Fixes Critical RCE in mod_http2 (CVE-2026-119618)</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<section lang="en">
<p><a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-12-pm-es/" hreflang="es">Leer este artículo en español</a></p>
<p>On November 11, the Apache Software Foundation released Apache HTTP Server 2.4.71, which fixes three vulnerabilities; the most severe is CVE-2026-119618, rated as <em>critical</em> by Apache: a race condition in the function <code>assign_headers()</code> of the module <code>mod_http2</code> (CWE-362) that corrupts the heap and allows unauthenticated remote code execution <a href='https://www.rescana.com/post/apache-httpd-mod-http2-cve-2026-119618-patch-now'>according to the Apache advisory</a>. It affects versions 2.4.55 through 2.4.70 inclusive and the standalone module <code>mod_h2</code> 2.0.8–2.0.42, whose repository has been archived since June 2026 and will not receive an official patch <a href='https://www.rescana.com/post/apache-httpd-mod-http2-cve-2026-119618-patch-now'>confirmed by Rescana</a>.</p>
<h2>The race condition in assign_headers allows unauthenticated RCE</h2>
<p>The flaw occurs when concurrent HTTP/2 requests access shared resources without proper synchronization. Only servers with HTTP/2 enabled —the <code>Protocols h2</code> or <code>h2c</code>directive— reach the vulnerable code; HTTP/1.1-only configurations are not exposed <a href='https://socprime.com/blog/cve-2026-119618-critical-apache-http-2-flaw-enables-remote-code-execution'>as clarified by SOCPrime</a>. The report came through two independent channels: Anthropic&#8217;s OSS scanner (October 26, identifier ANT-2026-MAPKT6MZ) and Anthony Weems with Simon Scannell of Google Cloud Vulnerability Research (November 3). Apache landed the fix in commit 824beab9b9424d6cfb29595248fdbf6c3dddeab1 and released 2.4.71 eleven days later. The same release also addresses CVE-2026-106023 (null dereference in <code>mod_md</code>, severity <em>important</em>) and CVE-2026-109163 (stack overwrite in <code>mod_vhost_alias</code>, severity <em>low</em>).</p>
<h2>Standalone mod_h2 left without official patch, forcing migration</h2>
<p>The module <code>mod_h2</code> maintained on GitHub (used in custom builds and containers) has no fixed version published. The only supported path is to migrate to the <code>mod_http2</code> integrated in httpd 2.4.71 or manually apply the backported patch in your fork. If you maintain base images or containers that embed <code>mod_h2</code>, audit them now: there will be no official backported patch.</p>
<h2>Distros and vendors move at different paces</h2>
<p>Debian unstable (<code>sid</code>) already includes <code>apache2 2.4.71-1</code>; <code>bookworm</code>, <code>trixie</code>, <code>forky</code> and Ubuntu still had no package as of November 11. Red Hat released updates for RHEL 9 (<code>mod_http2-2.0.26-7.el9_9.1</code>) and RHEL 10 (<code>2.0.29-5.el10_3.1</code>), but rates the severity as <em>Important</em> arguing that its per-stream allocator raises exploitation complexity; RHEL 8 and earlier do not contain the vulnerable code <a href='https://www.rescana.com/post/apache-httpd-mod-http2-cve-2026-119618-patch-now'>Rescana details</a>. Verify your provider&#8217;s schedule before assuming coverage.</p>
<h2>What to do today: update, disable HTTP/2, or mitigate while the package arrives</h2>
<p>The priority is to update to 2.4.71 or your OS security package as soon as it’s available, starting with internet‑facing front‑ends that have HTTP/2 enabled. Validate third‑party module compatibility and configuration in a test environment before promoting to production. If you can’t update right away, disable HTTP/2 by removing <code>h2</code> and <code>h2c</code> from the <code>Protocols</code> (global and in <strong>all</strong> VirtualHosts) and force <code>Protocols http/1.1</code>; it’s a defensive hardening, not a fix, and you lose multiplexing and push <a href='https://socprime.com/blog/cve-2026-119618-critical-apache-http-2-flaw-enables-remote-code-execution'>recommends SOCPrime</a>. Take inventory with <code>httpd -M | grep http2</code> and review <code>Protocols</code> in <code>httpd.conf</code> and all includes. Monitor logs after patching: worker crashes with <code>SIGSEGV</code> in <code>assign_headers</code> or unexpected restarts may indicate failed exploitation attempts <a href='https://www.rescana.com/post/apache-httpd-mod-http2-cve-2026-119618-patch-now'>notes Apache</a>. Finally, ask your SaaS, PaaS, or CDN providers that use Apache as a front‑end whether they have already applied 2.4.71 or an equivalent backported patch.</p>
<section class="article-reference">
<h2>Structured reference for readers and AI agents</h2>
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  &quot;summary&quot;: &quot;Apache releases version 2.4.71 fixing a race condition in mod_http2 that allows unauthenticated remote code execution on servers with HTTP/2 enabled.&quot;,
  &quot;author&quot;: &quot;Rafael Fuentes&quot;,
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  ]
}</code></pre>
</section>
</section>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-12-pm-en/">Apache HTTP Server 2.4.71 Fixes Critical RCE in mod_http2 (CVE-2026-119618)</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Red Hat releases RHEL 10.3 and 9.9: sealed images in 10.3, MCP server GA, and native PQC</title>
		<link>https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-12-am-en/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=rafael-fuentes-2026-11-12-am-en</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rafael Fuentes]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 05:13:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial Intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cryptography]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Healthcare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Quantum]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-12-am-en/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Red Hat has released RHEL 10.3 and 9.9; 10.3 debuts sealed images in GA, the MCP server goes GA, and both include post‑quantum cryptography ready for CNSA 2.0.</p>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-12-am-en/">Red Hat releases RHEL 10.3 and 9.9: sealed images in 10.3, MCP server GA, and native PQC</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<section lang="en">
<p><a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-12-am-es/" hreflang="es">Leer este artículo en español</a></p>
<p>Red Hat has made RHEL 10.3 and RHEL 9.9 generally available on November 11, 2026. Version 10.3 introduces <strong>sealed images</strong> for image mode now in GA, the <strong>MCP server</strong> for RHEL promoted from Developer Preview to production, a self‑managed CLI assistant for disconnected environments, and native support for post‑quantum algorithms (ML‑KEM, ML‑DSA) in IKEv2, SSH, Go, and TLS 1.3. If you manage RHEL fleets in regulated sectors — finance, healthcare, public administration — or are preparing the migration to CNSA 2.0, this release changes what you can audit and automate today without recompiling anything.</p>
<h2>Sealed images, only in RHEL 10.3, close the chain of trust to the runtime</h2>
<p>The structural novelty is <strong>sealed images</strong> for image mode, available only in RHEL 10.3: the kernel rejects any modified content at read time thanks to a read‑only root filesystem signed with your own secure boot keys. Verification covers firmware, bootloader, kernel, and root filesystem end to end. In practice, you can prove that the OS in production matches bit for bit what was signed in your pipeline of <code>bootc</code>/RHEL image builder. <em>Condition</em>: it applies only to new image mode deployments; traditional RPM systems do not benefit directly. It requires your own signing infrastructure and a redesign of provisioning. The <a href='https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/introducing-red-hat-enterprise-linux-103-and-99'>Red Hat advisory</a> and the <a href='https://9to5linux.com/red-hat-enterprise-linux-10-3-released-with-sealed-images-for-image-mode'>9to5Linux coverage</a> detail the integrity model.</p>
<h2>MCP server GA and self‑managed CLI assistant bring AI to diagnostics without leaving the perimeter</h2>
<p>The <strong>MCP server</strong> moves to GA packaged as an RPM in the RHEL extensions repository, installable with <code>dnf</code> alongside <code>goose</code> (open source CLI agent). Exposes Performance Co‑Pilot (PCP) history to AI assistants to automatically correlate intermittent events. The variant <strong>self‑managed CLI assistant</strong> (Developer Preview) runs inference locally, keeping model guidance and operational context in air‑gapped environments — banking, defense, critical infrastructure. <em>Limitation</em>: in multi‑tenant or strictly isolated environments, review which PCP metrics the server shares and configure RBAC on the MCP server before enabling it.</p>
<h2>Native PQC in standard toolchains targets CNSA 2.0</h2>
<p>RHEL 10.3 and 9.9 integrate <strong>ML‑KEM‑768/1024 in IKEv2</strong> (libreswan 5.4), hybrid PQC key exchange for SSH in FIPS mode, <strong>ML‑DSA in <code>crypto/mldsa</code> Go</strong> and TLS 1.3 with PQC for remote audit. No need to recompile or link experimental libraries: the updated toolchains (GCC 16.2, LLVM 22.1.8, Go 1.27.3, Rust 1.97, .NET 11, Node.js 26 LTS) already expose the algorithms. <em>Condition</em>: verify latency and handshake size impact (larger keys and signatures) on IPsec VPNs, massive SSH, and audit TLS under real load. Not all remote peers will support hybrid PQC today.</p>
<h2>Validated Leapp paths and complementary hardening reduce operational friction</h2>
<p>The updates <strong>RHEL 9.9 → 10.3</strong> and <strong>RHEL 8.10 → 9.9</strong> are validated with Leapp, eliminating uncertainty in in‑place upgrades of large fleets. Note: kernels 6.12.x → 6.12.x (RHEL 10) and 5.14.x → 5.14.x (RHEL 9) may require recompiling DKMS/kernel third‑party modules; Leapp does not cover out‑of‑tree drivers not certified by Red Hat. In hardening, <strong>fapolicyd 2.0.1</strong> moves to multi‑threaded decision processing (review existing rules for possible race conditions) and <strong>Keylime 7.14.3</strong> adds evidence for confidential AMD SEV‑SNP VMs (requires EPYC 3rd gen+ and updated host firmware). The <strong>image‑builder CLI</strong> reaches GA and <strong>bootc‑image‑builder</strong> is deprecated in favor of RHEL image builder. Inventory toolchains (GCC 16, Go 1.27, Rust 1.97, Node 26) to recompile internal applications before deploying to production. Both versions require an active subscription; the 60‑day evaluation edition lets you validate sealed images, MCP, and PQC at no cost.</p>
<section class="article-reference">
<h2>Structured reference for readers and AI agents</h2>
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  ]
}</code></pre>
</section>
</section>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-12-am-en/">Red Hat releases RHEL 10.3 and 9.9: sealed images in 10.3, MCP server GA, and native PQC</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Box launches Architect and activates agent security controls in GA</title>
		<link>https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-11-am-en/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=rafael-fuentes-2026-11-11-am-en</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rafael Fuentes]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 05:15:58 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial Intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[OpenAI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[incident response]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-11-am-en/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Box announces Architect for creating natural-language agentic workflows on your content and places classification guardrails, MCP, and thresholds into general availability for Shield and Enterprise Advanced tenants.</p>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-11-am-en/">Box launches Architect and activates agent security controls in GA</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<section lang="en">
<p><a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-11-am-es/" hreflang="es">Leer este artículo en español</a></p>
<p>Box has announced <a href='https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20261105710957/en/Box-Unveils-the-Next-Generation-of-Enterprise-AI-with-New-Agentic-Workflow-Automation-and-Advanced-Threat-Detection'>Architect</a>, a natural-language tool for designing, testing, and managing agentic workflows directly on the content you already have stored in Box, and has placed agent security controls for tenants <strong>Shield</strong> and <strong>Enterprise Advanced</strong>. The news affects security teams, platform architects, and CISOs who use Box as a content layer and need to govern agents without adding external layers. It matters today — six days after the BoxWorks announcement — because the classification controls, <a href='https://www.techzine.eu/news/collaboration/145599/box-architect-builds-agentic-workflows-using-enterprise-content'>MCP Guardrails</a> and activity thresholds can be activated now, while the Architect beta starts in Q4 2026 and agentic threat protection arrives in early 2027.</p>
<h2>Architect orchestrates agents over your content with inherited permissions</h2>
<p>Describe a process in natural language and Architect defines phases, decision points, and handoffs applying the existing permissions, classifications, and retention policies at each step. Before putting it into production you can test it with real content and edge cases, preview the output and agent routing, and insert human approval at critical moments. The operational novelty is the <strong>multi-model selection per step</strong>: you choose Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, NVIDIA, IBM, or others based on task complexity, using cheaper models for simple steps and complex-reasoning models for critical ones. The beta will be available in Q4 2026 only for Enterprise Advanced customers.</p>
<h2>Agent security controls now in GA: classification, MCP Guardrails, and thresholds</h2>
<p>Three controls are active as of today for Shield and Enterprise Advanced:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Classification-based policies</strong> that decide what content agents can consult, blocking access to unnecessary sensitive information.</li>
<li><strong>MCP Guardrails</strong> (Model Context Protocol) that limit the tools agents can invoke: create, move, share content externally.</li>
<li><strong>Threshold alerts</strong> that alert when an agent&#8217;s activity exceeds customer-defined limits.</li>
</ul>
<p>These controls <strong>only protect actions on content in Box</strong>. They do not cover calls to external APIs or tools outside the Box ecosystem unless integrated via Box Automate/Apps.</p>
<h2>Agentic threat protection arriving in early 2027</h2>
<p>Box is developing automated detection and response to specific agent vectors with write capability: mass exfiltration, session hijacking, and account takeover via <em>session binding</em> and device-bound credentials, suspicious sharing, and mass deletion. Responses are graduated: from download restrictions to step-up authentication or session termination. It will be available early 2027 for Enterprise Advanced and Shield. Meanwhile, <strong>the GA controls (classification, MCP, thresholds) are the only technical barrier</strong>.</p>
<h2>What to do now: enable controls, pilot in low-risk, and map dependencies</h2>
<ul>
<li><strong>Enable the Agent Security Controls now</strong> (classification + MCP Guardrails + thresholds) in your Shield / Enterprise Advanced tenants. Condition: they only protect actions on content in Box.</li>
<li><strong>Define classification policies aligned with your existing DLP</strong> before enabling Architect. Limitation: if the taxonomy is lax, the guardrails won&#8217;t block access to sensitive data.</li>
<li><strong>Set activity thresholds by flow type</strong> (e.g., max 50 documents/hour in contract review) and alert SIEM/SOAR. Thresholds are static; complement with UEBA on <em>service accounts</em> of agents.</li>
<li><strong>Require human review (<em>human-in-the-loop</em>) on write, share, or delete steps</strong> in all production flows. Architect supports it natively, but does not enforce it by default.</li>
<li><strong>Pilot Architect in Q4 2026 only in non-production or <em>low-risk</em></strong> (internal onboarding, template review). Beta without SLA; measure cost/token per step, end-to-end latency, and human escalation rate before deploying critical processes.</li>
<li><strong>Map external dependencies</strong> (ERP, CRM, e-signature, Git) and assess whether Box Automate/Apps covers the integration without custom code. If required <em>custom code</em>, the promise <em>low-code</em> is diluted.</li>
<li><strong>Plan migration to Agentic Threat Protection (early 2027)</strong> with tests of <em>session binding</em> and device-bound credentials. Review compatibility with identity providers (Entra ID, Okta, Ping) and conditional access policies.</li>
<li><strong>Document <em>runbooks</em> for agentic incident response</strong>: exfiltration, session hijacking, mass deletion. Box&#8217;s automatic response (restriction, <em>step-up</em>, termination) is configurable; define activation thresholds and escalation to SOC.</li>
<li><strong>Evaluate portability</strong>: export flow definitions (YAML/JSON) and test execution in an alternative engine (LangGraph, Temporal). Avoid <em>vendor lock-in</em> if Box changes pricing, APIs, or <em>roadmap</em>.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Vendor dependency and operational maturity risk</h2>
<p>Multi-model orchestration is convenient, but it ties flow logic to the Box platform. Teams that need portability to other layers (LangGraph, Semantic Kernel, n8n, Temporal) will have to export and translate the definitions. Additionally, the Q4 2026 beta means that <strong>there is no production SLA</strong> nor performance guarantees at scale. The risk of <em>shadow AI</em> is partially mitigated by requiring agents to operate on content in Box with existing permissions, but <strong>does not cover</strong> agents that access systems outside Box (ERP, CRM, Git) unless they are integrated via Box Automate/Apps.</p>
<section class="article-reference">
<h2>Structured reference for readers and AI agents</h2>
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  &quot;language&quot;: &quot;en&quot;,
  &quot;title&quot;: &quot;Box launches Architect and activates agent security controls in GA&quot;,
  &quot;summary&quot;: &quot;Box announces Architect for creating natural-language agentic workflows on your content and places classification guardrails, MCP, and thresholds into general availability for Shield and Enterprise Advanced tenants.&quot;,
  &quot;author&quot;: &quot;Rafael Fuentes&quot;,
  &quot;publicationDate&quot;: &quot;2026-11-11T06:01:16.045+01:00&quot;,
  &quot;eventDate&quot;: &quot;2026-11-05&quot;,
  &quot;url&quot;: &quot;https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-11-am-en/&quot;,
  &quot;translation&quot;: {
    &quot;language&quot;: &quot;es&quot;,
    &quot;url&quot;: &quot;https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-11-am-es/&quot;
  },
  &quot;topics&quot;: [
    &quot;AI&quot;,
    &quot;Artificial Intelligence&quot;,
    &quot;English&quot;,
    &quot;OpenAI&quot;
  ],
  &quot;sources&quot;: [
    &quot;https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20261105710957/en/Box-Unveils-the-Next-Generation-of-Enterprise-AI-with-New-Agentic-Workflow-Automation-and-Advanced-Threat-Detection&quot;,
    &quot;https://www.techzine.eu/news/collaboration/145599/box-architect-builds-agentic-workflows-using-enterprise-content&quot;
  ]
}</code></pre>
</section>
</section>
<p>La entrada <a href="https://falifuentes.com/rafael-fuentes-2026-11-11-am-en/">Box launches Architect and activates agent security controls in GA</a> se publicó primero en <a href="https://falifuentes.com">Fali Fuentes</a>.</p>
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